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Neoliberalism and Access to Justice – Some Preliminary Findings 
 
Introduction 
This paper sets out some preliminary findings which will form part of my PhD thesis on the broad 
topic of the impact of neoliberalism on access to justice. I am conducting empirical research in 
order to identify and examine trends in summary justice which appear to have been influenced by 
neoliberal political ideology, and consider how those trends may have affected the ability of those 
charged with criminal offences to access the information which will enable them to participate 
effectively in the proceedings.  
 
The observations from which these finding emanate form part of a broader concern about the 
impact of changes to access to publicly funded representation in summary criminal proceedings, 
set within a broader context of politically driven concerns about criminal case progression in an 
era that requires austerity and efficiency in publicly funded institutions. The research draws 
heavily on the findings of earlier socio-legal studies of summary justice, most notably Carlen 
(1976), Bottoms and McClean (1976), McBarnett (1981), Sanders (2002), Morgan (2000) and 
Darbyshire (1997) 
 
The issue that I will discuss today – how law is used in magistrates’ courts, is only one of many 
issues that have arisen following observation of magistrates’ court proceedings in late 2012 and 
early 2013. Other important matters that remain, for today’s purposes, part of the background, 
include levels of and funding for legal representation, the well documented differences between 
how magistrates and District Judges process cases and the use of forms as a manifestation of 
bureaucratic decision making processes. It is important to keep these issues in mind as it would 
be extremely difficult to isolate causal influences that have an impact on summary criminal 
proceedings.  
 
Methodology 
The empirical research thus begins from the premise that it is important to understand the way in 
which summary justice is presently administered, and it was against this background that 
observation was performed. The equivalent of twenty days observation was conducted at four 
magistrates’ courts in Kent – five days at each court. A total of 184 cases were observed, ranging 
from applications for arrest warrants, case seizures, administrative hearings, pleas, trials and 
sentencing. The aims of the observation were: 
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1. To identify levels of legal representation 
2. To identify how representation was funded 
3. To identify differences (if any) in case handling and outcome between represented and 
unrepresented defendants 
4. To identify patterns of behaviour (if any) which tended to ostracise defendants (whether 
represented or not) so that they remain only ‘dummy players’ (Carlen, 1976) in the 
proceedings. 
 
It is the fourth of these aims to which these findings refer. The observation findings will be used 
to develop semi-structured interviews with both prosecution and defence advocates. 
 
An issue that is of methodological importance to my work is my role within the institutions that I 
observed. I am a practising criminal defence advocate. I have been a criminal defence solicitor for 
seven years and have worked in the criminal justice system since 2002. I regularly appear in the 
courts that I was observing and was easily identifiable by members of the Bench, court legal 
advisors and advocates, all of whom showed some degree of interest in my presence as a court 
observer. This placed me in the role of “participant – as – observer” (Bryman, 2008; 410), which 
has three wider-reaching implications for my research: 
1. The implications on my ability to conduct impartial and thorough observations in an area 
with which I am so familiar 
2. Whether I will be able to identify issues which are significant but seem mundane to 
someone familiar with the setting 
3. Whether I was able to identify nuanced behaviour which may not be obvious to a lay 
observer. 
 
So far as the first point is concerned, Bryman notes “The researcher’s prolonged immersion in a 
social setting would seem to make him or her better equipped to see as others see…also, he or she 
participates in many of the same kinds of activity as the members of the social setting being 
studied” (2008; 465). While the concern that my immersion in the environment may lead me to 
take significant behaviours for granted is noted, that immersion carries with it certain other 
benefits which could alter the understanding of the topic concerned.  
 
The most relevant issue here relates to “learning the native language…it is also very often the 
‘argot’ – the special uses of words and slang that are important to penetrate that culture” 
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(Bryman, 2008; 465). Further, while the presence of a participant observer can result in reactive 
effects, several advocates (both prosecuting and defending) commented that, although my 
presence as observer was unusual, they did not pay a lot of attention to what I was doing because 
I was already an ‘insider’ or ‘on their team’. One prosecutor commented that, when an unknown 
observer is present, they must be on their ‘best behaviour’ – a formality which seemed to be 
unnecessary with me. This point does, however, have to be balanced against the risk of over-
identification with the research subjects. Indeed, the fact that I was able to identify poor practices 
that I myself have participated in (such as basically ignoring defendants in the dock to chat with 
other advocates while magistrates were in retirement) enabled me to retain a degree of reflexivity 
about what I was observing.  
 
By far the greatest advantage that my practitioner-researcher/participant-observer role gave me 
was my location in the same epistemic community as my subjects. This stance is what has 
enabled me to identify and analyse how law is used in summary proceedings. I suggest that points 
of law arise much more frequently in magistrates’ courts than has previously been estimated, and 
I am able to make this argument specifically because I am familiar with the language of the court 
and provisions to which implicit reference is often made.  
 
This section considers how points of law manifest themselves in the four magistrates’ courts 
studied. It considers the ways in which law is referred to in summary proceedings and situates the 
construction of legal issues in contemporary trends in criminal justice.  
 
Socio-legal scholars have regarded magistrates’ courts as venues in which proceedings are 
processed quickly, with minimal due process protections, and give the impression that those 
advocates who refer to points of law are dismissed as inexperienced and/or time wasting (Carlen, 
1976; Bottoms and McClean, 1976; McBarnett, 1981). This theme appears to persist in summary 
criminal proceedings, as, according to Darbyshire (2011), lawyers who raise so-called spurious 
legal issues are still regarded as a threat to what Carlen (1976) referred to as the uncomfortable 
compromise which typifies the working relationships that exist between professional court 
personnel.  As a result, one gains the impression that points of law are seldom referred to or, 
alternatively, that  when legal issues are raised, they are treated as an inconvenience; as 
something which delays the volume processing of cases because legal ideology has been 
subordinated to bureaucratic requirements (McBarnett, 1981). As recently as 2011, Darbyshire 
(2011) reported that District Judges took the view that legal argument should not be raised in 
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magistrates’ courts, because the magistrates’ court is the place of common sense, describing it as 
a “law free zone” (Darbyshire, 2011; 171). Notably, when Carlen (1976), McBarnett (1981) and 
Bottoms and McClean (1976) conducted their studies, defendants tended to appear without the 
assistance of a solicitor and the police, rather than qualified lawyers, were the prosecutors. The 
Crown Prosecution Service took over state led prosecutions in 1986 and, by 1986/87, four-fifths 
of defendants appearing in magistrates’ courts were legally represented (Legal Action Group, 
1992). Kemp (2010) noted that 82% of defendants in her magistrates’ court sample were legally 
represented, nearly all via public funding.  
 
It is possible that the two above-mentioned factors (although isolating causes is likely to be 
difficult) have led to increased reference to legal provisions in summary proceedings. Indeed, 
Darbyshire (2011) reported the dismay expressed by one District Judge that more people were 
attempting to raise legal arguments in magistrates’ courts. My observations suggest that there are 
frequent references to particular points of law during the course of summary proceedings in both 
implied and explicit terms. Particular points of law are most likely to be referred to during the 
course of sentencing proceedings. Furthermore, the provisions of the Bail Act 1976 are often 
implicitly referred to, while both implied and explicit reference to the construction of charges and 
required evidence are also relatively common in the course of case management. As Darbyshire 
(2011) acknowledges, the fact that legal argument is unusual does not mean that the law is not 
applied in summary proceedings, but that it is often applied in routinised ways. The implication 
of this is that it at least perpetuates, if not exacerbates, practices which exclude defendants from 
active participation in the proceedings. I hope to demonstrate this by reference to 3 instances in 
which implicit references to law appear to have a significant role in summary proceedings – 
sentencing guidelines, bail and case management hearings.  
 
Sentencing Guidelines 
Providing sentencing guidelines to magistrates is an example of measures designed to combat 
inconsistent decision making practices (Darbyshire, 1997; Davies, 2005). There is arguably a 
convergence of law and bureaucracy here, which there is not time to develop at this stage. The 
Sentencing Council states: 
“It is important to ensure that courts across England and Wales are consistent in their 
approach to sentencing. Sentencing guidelines, which set out a decision-making process for all 
judges and magistrates to follow, play an essential role in this” (Sentencing Council, 2012). 
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The sentencing guidelines are based on statute, case law and policy documents, and are therefore 
based on particular legal provisions according to precedent. Thus, while the guidelines are not 
strictly points of law, they represent a distillation of legal opinion about the severity of offences. 
According to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the use of sentencing guidelines is mandatory 
unless it is not in the interests of justice to follow a particular guideline. Therefore, in order to 
determine the most appropriate sentence in any case, a working knowledge of the guidelines is 
advantageous – either to highlight specific aggravating and/or mitigating features or to argue that 
it would not be in the interests of justice to apply a particular guideline. Of the thirty-seven 
references that I found to the sentencing guidelines, seventeen of those references were implicit – 
for example, stating that a theft was opportunistic or an assault was unprovoked, which are 
matters specifically recorded as mitigating features (Sentencing Council, 2012).  
Sentencing guidelines in their present form did not exist until 2003, when the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council was created under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The Sentencing Guidelines 
Council became the Sentencing Council in 2010. As that agency notes, “Guidelines are a 
relatively new innovation in sentencing so there aren’t guidelines for every offence yet, and 
where they don’t exist, judges look at previous similar cases for guidance on appropriate 
sentencing levels”(Sentencing Council, 2012). The sentencing guidelines therefore represent a 
coordinated effort to ensure more consistency and thereby appear to introduce a greater degree of 
specialised legal knowledge into summary proceedings than has previously been noted. 
Bail 
At first glance, matters concerning bail might appear to be a matter of mere formality. However, 
the fact of being placed on bail, with or without conditions, allows any criminal court to prosecute 
an individual who fails to attend Court while subject to bail under s.6 Bail Act 1976. Therefore, 
every time a defendant is released on bail, at whatever stage in proceedings, he or she is 
effectively put on notice that there will be further charges if s/he fails to attend court as directed. 
The provisions of the Bail Act 1976 state that bail may be refused or bail with conditions may be 
imposed to ensure attendance at court, to ensure the defendant does not commit an offence while 
on bail or to ensure that the course of justice is not obstructed. Those exceptions to the right to 
(unconditional) bail appear to be referred to in implicit terms when prosecutors make applications 
to remand defendants into custody and when defence advocates apply for bail to be granted with 
conditions, as any conditions that are suggested are designed to meet concerns about the 
exceptions to the right to bail.  
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Furthermore, provisions of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
which came into force on 3 December 2012 now state that the prosecutor can only apply for a 
remand into custody if there is a realistic prospect of a custodial sentence on conviction, with 
certain limited exceptions such as proceedings relating to domestic violence. Not only does this 
suggest that knowledge of sentencing guidelines is advantageous, but also my observations 
suggest that it is now not uncommon to hear prosecutors address the court simply by stating that 
there is or is not a realistic prospect of custody in applications for remand into custody or on bail. 
This is an implicit reference to provisions, the significance of which may not be understood by a 
‘lay’ person. It should also be noted that particular provisions state that the decision to grant bail 
based on the fact that a custodial sentence is not a realistic sentencing option does not affect the 
power of the sentencing court to ultimately impose a custodial sentence. Again, these are matters 
that appear to post date earlier socio-legal studies of magistrates’ courts proceedings, and are 
particular legal provisions, of which knowledge is advantageous in framing submissions to the 
magistrates. The implicit use of legal provisions is therefore significant in summary proceedings, 
and could result in misunderstanding to the untrained ear. The implicit use of those terms 
highlights, and perhaps more recently exacerbates, the paradox of summary justice in that it 
requires knowledge of procedural propriety but denies access to that knowledge by the 
unexplained use of jargon and signaling (Carlen, 1976). 
Case Management 
Case management hearings have evolved from Narey’s suggestion in 1997 that pre trial review 
hearings may alleviate the volume of ineffective trial listings that occurred in magistrates’ courts. 
Auld, in 2001, became concerned about the number of Pre Trial Reviews that occurred and 
believed that the parties should take a more co-operative approach to case management. In 2005, 
the Criminal Justice: Simple Speedy Summary initiative (which sought to reduce delay in 
summary proceedings) proposed the abandonment of pre trial reviews in favour of more proactive 
case management outside the court. However, case management hearings remain in place in Kent. 
 
Case Management forms have both administrative and legal roles in magistrates’ court processes. 
Case Management forms require the parties to state the matters that are in dispute, the witness 
requirements (and reasons why witnesses are required), any further evidence to be served and any 
legal argument that is envisaged. As such, they require the parties to narrow the contested issues 
at trial so that court time can be used in the most efficient manner. The forms are also used to 
prevent the Crown being ‘ambushed’ at trial, which has the effect of focusing the Crown 
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Prosecutor’s time and resources only on those matters that are disputed (DPP –v- Chorley 
Justices and Andrew Forrest [2006] EWHC 1795; Malcolm-v- DPP (2007) EWHC 363 
(Admin)).  
 
Case management forms are part of the executive’s desire to increase efficiency under the 
Criminal Procedure Rules and therefore have an administrative function. Case management forms 
do also, however, have a role in potential legal argument about how evidential burdens are 
discharged and whether it would be just for trials to proceed. The form requires a defence 
advocate (the wording of the form assumes that the defendant has received advice) to indicate 
that a defendant has been advised that a trial can proceed in his or her absence if the defendant 
fails to attend Court as directed (See R (on the application of Drinkwater) –v- Solihull 
Magistrates’ Court [2012] EWHC 765 (Admin), R –v- Jones [2002] UKHL 5), which is relevant 
to whether proceedings should continue in the absence of a defendant and whether a charge of 
failing to attend Court as directed can be laid.  
 
Furthermore, the answers provided on Case Management forms can be used as evidence during 
the course of a trial, as an implied admission to particular elements constituting an offence, such 
as presence at the scene. This practice is however discouraged (R –v- Newell [2012] EWCA Crim 
650).  
 
The completion of Case Management forms represents a convergence of law and bureaucratic 
measures designed to ensure consistency and efficiency, as questions are reduced to a series of 
tick box answers – such as a yes/no answer as to whether the defendant has been advised about 
credit for entering an early guilty plea -  with limited space to explain the issues.There is a 
specific section of the Case Management form which asks whether the parties can agree a basis of 
plea or plea to an alternative charge. Thus the form becomes a way of demonstrating that the 
parties are acting in an efficient, co-operative manner, as well as a document which, in order to be 
completed appropriately, requires knowledge of both the nature of the charge and the evidential 
burdens which the Crown must satisfy to prove its case. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
It seems therefore that points of law arise more frequently in summary proceedings than has 
previously been observed. This could result from a number of factors, and causal links may be 
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impossible to isolate. The most relevant factors appear to be increased levels of representation 
(Legal Action Group, 1992), a desire for magistrates’ courts to retain work (Darbyshire, 1997), 
the removal of low level, uncontested offending from the magistrates’ courts via the increased use 
of fixed penalty notices/cautions (Morgan, 2010) and a welter of new offences and legislation 
relating to the criminal justice process (Baillie, 2011; Ashworth and Zedner, 2008). 
There has been a desire for magistrates’ courts to retain cases rather than send them to the Crown 
Court since the late 1990s (Darbyshire, 1997). So, while Darbyshire (2011) asserts that lawyers 
who wish to raise legal argument will, where possible, try to have the case dealt with in the 
Crown Court, there are bureaucratic measures which seek to deter committal to the Crown Court -  
not least the removal of committal fees and reduced guilty plea fees for advocates (Legal Services 
Commission, 2011) This desire has resulted from the government’s hope to accelerate the 
processing of criminal cases as magistrates’ courts tend to deal with cases more quickly than 
Crown Courts. Sanders (2010), and Ashworth and Zedner (2008), note that a significant number 
of new offences created in the last two or three decades are strict liability matters, which are 
usually confined to summary only proceedings and are easier to prove than those offences 
requiring mens rea. 
Case complexity has increased (Cape and Moorhead, 2005), which may have been as a result of a 
flurry of relevant legislation or of the removal of unchallenged minor offences from magistrates’ 
courts. The removal of low level offending from magistrates’ courts via diversionary processes 
was also designed to increase efficiency in the criminal justice process, as were co-operative 
practices encouraged by the Criminal Procedure Rules (from which case management hearings 
are derived) (Auld, 2001). Not only do those co-operative practices discourage defendant’s 
participation in the proceedings (Carlen, 1976), they encourage the parties to focus more on the 
legal and evidential issue involved in trials. This has the effect of prompting disagreement about 
what is necessary to pursue a prosecution (Welsh, 2010), thereby encouraging dispute in relation 
to points of law, particularly when a defendant is legally represented. Alternatively, this might be 
evidence of lawyer’s attempts to increase fees received by contesting spurious issues - this is the 
supplier-induced demand theory, which has been much criticised. See for example, Cape and 
Moorhead (2005), although the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Rules, and other 
government led efficiency drives, such as Stop Delaying Justice! are designed to prevent such 
practices. My observations suggest that of the forty hearings in which defendants were 
unrepresented, eleven included references to points of law. There were 143 hearings in which 
defendants were legally represented, which included 105 references (either explicit or implicit) to 
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points of law (there may have been more than one reference per case). Furthermore, the routine 
provision of case papers has enabled cases to be analysed in greater detail at an early stage in 
proceedings (Cape and Moorhead, 2005). Therefore, somewhat ironically, measures designed to 
speed up the process of summary justice may have also encouraged more explicit references to 
points of law. Given that most defendants are legally represented – only 40 of the 184 defendants 
I observed were not legally represented - it is arguable that those issues would be less likely to 
arise if defendants were unrepresented, which may, in turn, further increase the pace of 
proceedings. However, evidence suggests that the presence of lawyers actually increase 
efficiency by negotiating pleas (Mulcahy, 1994) and co-operating with proceedings (Goriely, 
1996). 
It seems therefore that either the frequency with which points of law arise in summary 
proceedings has either been previously underestimated or, perhaps more likely, that levels of 
representation, alongside procedures designed to direct more serious cases to important issues of 
dispute and new legislation have increased references to points of law in summary proceedings. 
